Insights from a Simple Two-Sector Model
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Introduction
The robust empirical finding that exporting firms are not only rare but also systematically different from firms that merely serve domestic consumers has challenged both the old Ricardian and neoclassical trade theories as well as the new trade theories along the lines of Krugman, Brander and Spencer. To account for the empirical fact that exporting firms are typically larger and more productive than non-exporters, a new generation of new trade models was developed which takes the heterogeneity of firms in terms of their productivity into account with seminar contributions by Melitz (2003) , Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Yeaple (2005) . 1 Follow-up research led to a voluminous literature that expanded the scope of these theories of heterogeneous firms and trade to comprehend endowment-driven comparative advantage , competition effects (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) and the repercussions between trade, FDI and labor markets, amongst others.
2
A very recent strand of research has started to explore the economic policy implications of the theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. Melitz (2003) has initiated this policy analysis by
showing that countries reap welfare gains by shifting from autarky to trade (i.e. there are gains from trade) and by proving that reciprocal trade liberalization is welfare enhancing for all parties. However, his analysis was confined to a setting where countries are identical in all
respects. Yet, countries do differ along many dimensions, such as size, technologies and a variety of other business conditions, in practice. Can we be sure that his insights still hold when country asymmetries are taken into account? It is comforting to see that recent research has shown the gains from trade to be robust when countries are (strongly) asymmetric in many dimensions that have so far been put under scrutiny. However, recent work also conveys the message that matters may be different when countries already engage in trade. Technological improvements in one country's modern sector then unambiguously hurt the trading partner.
When business conditions in a broad sense are superior in one country, trade liberalization brings a welfare benefit to the superior country whereas the inferior country may experience a welfare loss. Moreover, it has also been shown that the liberalization path matters, i.e. it makes a big difference whether liberalization is unilateral or reciprocal.
Further important policy questions have been addressed in recent work. One strand of research recognizes that governments are heavily engaged in the regulation of entry by requiring licences, 2 permits and other legal barriers. On the other hand, they also provide various types of support for the foundation of new firms, e.g. subsidies to market entry and R&D activities. Interestingly, in contrast to classical trade policy instruments (such as import tariffs or export subsidies) these policies are perceived as largely domestic issues and therefore not put under scrutiny by bodies like the WTO. It is nonetheless important to ask whether these policies have international repercussions and how they play out. Recent research shows that such policies indeed involve international spillovers and that governments therefore may have an incentive to use these instruments strategically in the open economy.
The process of market exit is yet another issue which has received attention recently. Melitz (2003) focused on a stationary equilibrium where firms die with a constant probability irrespectively of their productivity and are replaced by new entrants. However, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that highly productive firms are much less prone to firm death than unproductive ones. Incorporating this fact into a theoretical framework delivers insights for the average death rates of mature firms and their determinants. For example, the switch from autarky to trade implies not only an increase in the average productivity of firms but also a reduction in the risk of business exit.
The aim of this paper is to work out and synthesize the key lessons of this recent research in a unifying framework. To bring these results out with utmost simplicity, we use a two-sector version of the Melitz (2003) model with a competitive sector ('traditional good') in addition to the monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms ('modern sector'). The fruitfulness of this modelling strategy was already convincingly demonstrated by Helpman and Krugman (1985; 1989) in exposing the policy implications of the new trade theory with homogeneous firms. 3 The seminal papers by Melitz and Ottaviano (2009) and Demidova (2008) were the first contributions which adopted two-sector frameworks to analyze the implications of the theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. Our synthesis follows Demidova (2008) in choosing a CES- Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) representation of the modern sector. We deviate from her by assuming a simple yet standard specification of the research and development process and by working with a simpler, quasi-linear, upper tier utility function. These two changes allow us to gain considerable tractability. In particular, we are able to provide all results in closed-form. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) provide an alternative two-sector model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms which, by the assumption of a quadratic quasi-linear upper tier utility function, is already much more tractable than the one-sector Melitz (2003) 3 model. 4 Rather than using the Dixit-Stiglitz specification of the modern sector, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) employ the linear demand system with horizontal product differentiation along the lines of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) . In contrast to the Dixit-Stiglitz framework which implies that mark-ups over marginal costs are constant across firms and invariant to market size in the large-group case the linear Ottaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse-framework features a pro-competitive effect. This feature renders the latter framework without any doubt attractive. However, as many of the recent papers have used the Dixit-Stiglitz-specification as in
Melitz (2003), we use the same as it facilitates the exposition and discussion of these works.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section covers the model under autarky.
Section 3 discusses a two country trade version of the model. Section 4 contains our policy analysis. We cover gains from trade, trade liberalization with identical countries, the implications of differences in technology potentials, the competitive choice of entry subsidies and of policies targeted the infrastructure of basic research, the implications of business conditions along many dimensions, and the process of market exit. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
General set-up. We build on the two-sector version of the Melitz (2003) model with heterogeneous firms developed by Demidova (2008) . A traditional industry n produces a homogeneous numéraire good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and a modern monopolistic competitive industry c produces a continuum of differentiated varieties under increasing returns. Each variety is produced by a single firm. Firms' productivities are heterogeneous. Labor is the only factor of production in the economy. There are L workers who supply one unit of labor each. We first look at a single country in autarky.
Preferences. Household h 's preferences over the homogenous good h n and the set of modern varieties, Ω , are defined by a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility where w is h 's (wage) income and
is the perfect price index of the CES-aggregate. Utility maximization implies demand functions 
Technology and pricing. , respectively. A firm with higher productivity level ϕ thus charges a lower price, sells a larger quantity and has higher revenue and profits. Since all firm-specific variables differ only with respect to ϕ , the CES price index (2) can be rewritten as
where M denotes the mass of manufacturing firms (and varieties) in the market, ( ) ϕ µ is the productivity distribution across these active firms with positive support over a subset of ( )
and φ is an average productivity level as introduced by Melitz (2003 . Once in the market, every firm may be hit with constant probability δ by a negative shock which forces it to shut down and exit. We focus on a stationary equilibrium without time discounting such that in each period the mass of market entrants equals the mass of firms that are forced to shut down. Analytically,
, where
is the probability to draw a productivity no smaller than the cutoff . Melitz (2003) shows that such an equilibrium cutoff exists for a general class of productivity distributions. However, a closed-form solution is not obtained unless an adequate specification is chosen for the productivity distribution. We follow much of the literature in 
and a household's indirect utility is then: 
where
is the export revenue. There is a critical productivity threshold 
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i commands that firms enter the market until the value of entry is zero,
. The first term on the LHS formalizes the expected profits on the domestic market and the second term expresses expected profits on the export market where ) ( 1
denotes the probability for a productivity draw high enough to enter the export market. The RHS expresses the entry costs.
The resulting equilibrium cutoff productivities are derived as (see appendix D): 
are measures of trade openness which rise as variable trade costs ij τ and/or the fixed cost ratio Parameter restrictions. We impose three parameter conditions on the open economy. First, we want to ensure that both sectors are active in both countries,
(non-specialization in production), both before and after trade. This is the case whenever 
And third, it must hold true that
. It can be verified that the third condition is implied by the first and the second condition. Intuitively, the parameter restrictions imply that the overall business conditions in the modern sector of the two countries must not be too different. 
Policy analysis
Gains from trade and trade liberalization with identical countries
Our model deviates from the seminal contribution by Melitz (2003) in several ways: First, he used a one-sector increasing returns economy ('modern sector') whereas we consider a two sector economy which adds a traditional sector. Second, we consider an extensive list of country asymmetries. And finally, Melitz leaves the productivity lottery unspecified, whereas our analysis, for simplicity and tractability, draws on a Pareto distribution. Underlying these positive welfare effects is the aggregate productivity effect identified by Melitz. Both the switch from autarky to trade and the liberalization of trade lead to market entry of firms which reduces the demand for each producer and thereby drives the least productive firms out of business. This selection process raises the cutoff productivity, the aggregate productivity and the consumer's welfare. (Baldwin 2005) . 9 This process is similar to the 'competition effect' known in the New Economic Geography (e.g. Baldwin et al. 2003) as the reduction of demand associated with the market entry of firms works through a fall in the price level (see eq. (2), the price level P , which falls, when the mass of firms rises and remember that
). In the original Melitz (2003) model where the wage is normalized to one and where no traditional sector exists, this fall in the price level amounts to an increase in the real wage P / 1 which is why this process can also be thought of as working through the domestic factor market. Note, that this effect (however it may be termed) is distinct from
The technology potential and its consequences
International productivity differences are a classic topic in international economics ever since Ricardo's (1821) Demidova (2008) highlights differences in the technology potential in the sense that the 'productivity lottery' in one country stochastically dominates another country's lottery, or, to put it more prosaically, that firms, upon making an upfront entry investment, in some countries have access to a better pool of technologies than in other countries. Like Melitz (2003) , Demidova (2008) departs from a general distribution of the 'productivity lottery'. Of course, the essence of her analysis can also be conveyed by working with the Pareto specification of the productivity lottery. More specifically, we assume that one country, say H , disposes of a better technology potential in the heterogeneous sector in the sense that the minimal productivity draw exceeds the minimal productivity draw in country F , i.e.
Abstracting from all other country asymmetries and assuming 
, respectively. A comparison with eq. (5) reveals that despite differences in technology potentials both the 'laggard country' ( F ) and the 'leading' country ( H ) achieve gains from trade. 
Intuitively, a unilateral improvement in the technology potential of country i raises the profitability of the domestic market and gives local firms a competitive edge over their foreign competitors. This stimulates entry in country i and reduces the incentive to enter the modern industry in country j . The induced selection effect then leads to higher cutoffs and welfare in i the pro-competitive effect that arises in models where the mark-up over marginal costs is non-constant and is reduced when more firms enter the market (see Ottaviano et al. 2002 and Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) . 10 This special case has also been analyzed by Falvey et al. (2011) and by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . 11 Note that the parameter restrictions from section 3 still hold. Hence, the multiplicative terms of the international cutoffs are greater than one and the national cutoff productivities under trade greater than under autarky.
11
and lower cutoffs and welfare in j . Productivity improvements are thus a boon for the country where these improvements take place but they are a bane for the other country.
12
What is the welfare effect of symmetric trade integration if the two countries differ with respect to their technology potential but are identical in all other respects? Exploring the effect of
on the two countries' cutoffs and indirect utilities leads to the conclusion that immiserization in the technologically inferior country would occur iff
. However, these cases are ruled out in our model specification by the parameter restrictions we made to obtain a consistent analysis. More precisely, the parameter conditions for immiserization are also the conditions under which the 'laggard country' becomes fully specialized in the traditional good sector. Hence, we can conclude for our model specification that symmetric trade liberalization by necessity improves welfare in both countries.
13 Yet, drawing on Pflüger and Russek (2011a) we shall show and explain below that immiserization becomes a distinct possibly if the two countries differ in further business conditions, notably if they differ in size and market accessibility (see section 4.5).
Entry subsidies and welfare
An entrepreneur who is about to start business is faced with sunk costs related with the research and development of new products and with legal barriers to entry such as licenses and permits.
However, governments also provide numerous programs of support for the foundation of new firms. Such subsidies to market entry and R&D are very widely used. Unlike classical trade policy instruments such as import tariffs or export subsidies these policies are perceived as largely domestic issues and therefore not scrutinized by bodies like the WTO.
Taking these observations as starting point, Pflüger and Südekum (2009) . Governments are assumed to be benevolent. They choose their 12 policy such that the indirect utility of households v is maximized subject to the government budget constraint. In the following we will look at the base case where countries are assumed to be identical with the exception of possible differences in entry subsidies.
14 Starting with the autarky case, the optimal entry subsidy is immediately derived as
This subsidy is positively related to the raw level of entry costs e f and negatively to the elasticity of substitution σ . To gain an intuitive understanding of this result it is worthwhile to reflect on the market distortions that prevail in our two-sector economy. 15 There is in fact one distortion, the monopoly power of firms in the modern sector relative to the perfectly competitive traditional sector. Output is too low in the modern sector since prices are too high as indicated by the parameter σ which determines the mark-up on marginal costs (see eq. (3)).
This monopoly distortion provides the intuition for the negative relationship between * aut s and σ . The larger this distortion, the stronger is the incentive to subsidize. This is because an entry subsidy leads to firm entry, tougher competition and a higher cutoff, i.e. a selection effect which implies that the firms that remain in the market are more productive. However, the optimal entry subsidy that we reported above is just a second-best optimal policy. A direct way to target this distortion would be to subsidize consumption (or, alternatively, production) of the differentiated varieties. Pflüger and Südekum (2009) show that if the government had two instruments at its disposal, a consumption subsidy and an entry subsidy, the optimal policy would be to subsidize consumption at the rate σ ) which competitively choose their optimal entry subsidies. Each country takes the entry subsidy of the other country as given and a Nash equilibrium can then be determined.
Before proceeding to this Nash equilibrium note that an exogenous decrease of the entry costs in one country (say H ) raises the cutoff productivity in H and lowers the cutoff productivity in F (see eq. (7)). Intuitively, the increased competition and selection induced by the entry 13 subsidies is transmitted to the other country. Export market entry becomes more difficult for foreign enterprises, as domestic firms are now more productive and competitive. Hence, the foreign country experiences a negative selection effect, a welfare-reducing fall in its productivity cutoff. 
What is the reason for this non-monotonic effect of trade liberalization on the Nashequilibrium-subsidies? This question can be approached from two perspectives. First, we can look at the marginal benefits and marginal costs associated with these policies. The marginal benefit is the tighter selection process in the domestic market which gives domestic firms a competitive advantage in international trade. The marginal costs are that higher entry subsidies have to be financed by higher lump-sum taxes. Both marginal benefits and marginal costs can be shown to rise with the level of trade freeness. However, starting at autarky, marginal benefits rise more strongly at low levels of trade freeness than marginal costs whereas the opposite holds true for high levels of trade freeness. Intuitively, high entry subsidies are particularly attractive at high trade costs, since the firms that emerge as domestic exporters are highly productive and snatch substantial market shares from their rivals. However, when trade costs are low, there are already many domestic exporters and their productivity advantage compared to local (foreign) firms is smaller. Financing the entry subsidy is then also more costly as many entrepreneurs are induced to start up business without yielding a strong competitive edge vis-à-vis the foreign rivals. A second perspective looks at the international externalities that are associated with entry subsidization in open economies. There is the negative (inverse) selection effect that drives down the cutoff in the other economy. However, there is also a positive spillover in that the 14 foreign budget is relaxed as the number of foreign firms trying to enter falls. Netting out these externalities gives the result that the net externality is negative for low levels of trade freeness and high for high levels of trade freeness, rationalizing the results of over-und undersubsidization, respectively. These results imply that there are gains from policy cooperation such that the net-externality is internalized. Importantly, whether such a cooperation involves a decrease or increase of the subsidy rates depends crucially on the level of trade freeness. In particular, a complete joint removal of all entry subsidies would lead to a welfare loss.
Improving the research infrastructure
Another widely observed policy in developed economies is the financing of R&D both in direct form of public research projects and higher education and in indirect form by e.g. subsidising Bohnstedt, Schwarz and Südekum (2011) identify two motives for public research policies. The 'benevolent' motive is to tighten firm selection which raises average productivity, reduces the average consumer price in an economy and increases welfare. This effect is similar to the effect of entry subsidies and becomes already clear in the autarky scenario as the domestic cutoff rises with the technological potential (see eq. (5)). In open economies there also is a strategic motive.
If one country invests more than the other, its firms obtain a competitive advantage over their foreign competitors for similar reasons as in the previous section. Firms from the 'laggard country' now face tougher import competition and have greater difficulties to export their products. In terms of our model above, we would find that
changes by asymmetric investments into basic research, which alters the cutoffs of the two countries (see eq. (7)). If countries decide non-cooperatively on the volume of research investments, they overinvest as they do not take into account the negative cross-country externality which they exert on each other. Thus there are welfare gains by supranational policy cooperation.
Bohnstedt, Schwarz and Südekum (2011) 
Business Conditions
Business conditions, in practice, depend on many more factors than those we have considered in previous sections. This observation is the starting point of the analysis by Pflüger and Russek (2011a) . They consider a comprehensive set of factors that determine the conditions to do business as laid out in section 3 and they focus on the impact of trade and industrial policies on national productivities and welfare.
With respect to the shift from autarky to international trade, it becomes immediately apparent from an inspection of the cutoffs in eq. (7) that both countries reap welfare gains from trade even if they are asymmetric with respect to a variety of national business conditions. Moreover, even in the case where business conditions are so disparate that the 'laggard' country is driven into full specialization in the traditional industry by the shift from autarky to trade, and where consequentially all manufactures are produced in the 'leading' country, there are mutual gains from trade.
16 16 The specialization model is laid out in Pflüger and Russek (2011a).
Concerning the impact of bilateral trade integration, Pflüger and Russek (2011a) . Otherwise, the country which is the 'laggard' in terms of aggregated business conditions experiences welfare losses whereas the 'leader' reaps welfare gains. Hence, while we have shown that differences in technology potentials do not suffice to obtain immiserization of the 'laggard', such immiserization becomes a distinct possibility once we account for asymmetric business conditions in a much more comprehensive sense. This becomes evident by noting that 17 Furthermore, note that with differences in country size and market accessibility the parameter range of non-immiserization no longer coincides with the condition of non-specialization. Hence, in contrast to section 4.2., immiserization of the 'laggard' is a possible outcome (appendix F provides a numerical example).
The effect of bilateral trade integration can be decomposed into two unilateral trade integration measures. Unilateral trade integration is understood as an opening of a country's border for products from its trading partner without an equivalent measure on behalf of its trading partner (e.g., 0
A unilateral border opening facilitates export activities of foreign firms which tightens competition abroad and increases the cutoff and the level of welfare of the trading partner. The liberalizing country, instead, faces tougher import competition so that the domestic cutoff and the domestic level welfare of decrease.
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Concerning the effects of industrial policies, Pflüger and Russek (2011a) provide a considerable generalization of the finding that productivity improvements in one country hurt the other country as shown by Demidova (2008) . In fact, it follows immediately from the cutoffs (7) and the indirect utility (8) that the very same result holds with respect to comparative advantages due to lower wages, a lower exit risk and easier market entry. 19 Importantly, asymmetric effects on productivities and on welfare obtain in the two countries even if technology potentials are identical between countries. Furthermore, policy measures are sensitive with respect to the level 17 Note that differences in country size are inconsequential as was already found in Baldwin and Forslid (2006) and Baldwin (2005) . However, these authors concluded that symmetric trade integration must raise welfare in both countries. The difference to our findings can be explained by noting that the authors did neither account for differences in technology potentials nor the comprehensive set of business conditions that we highlight. 18 This qualitative finding was anticipated by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . 19 Differences in i f have an additional effect on productivities as they alternate the relative access of foreign firms to the domestic market (as 
A re-examination of the exit process
Following Melitz (2003) we assumed in section 2 that the exit risk of mature firms (i.e. firms that successfully entered the market after drawing their productivity) is given by the constant exogenous probability of firm death δ and therefore independent of the productivity of the firm.
The merits of this simplification are twofold. First, it facilitates the establishment of a steady state equilibrium where the productivity range, and hence the average productivity, of surviving firms is endogenously determined (Melitz 2003 (Melitz :1701 . Second, if the group of firms whose entry is not successful is taken into account, the model is in accord with the robust empirical finding, that new entrants have, on average, lower productivity and higher exit probability than incumbents (Melitz 2003 (Melitz :1701 , or, seen from a different angle, exiting firms have a lower productivity, on average, than surviving firms (Redding 2011: 6) .
The model of section 2 has the further implication that the overall exit rate in the economy is positively related to the equilibrium cutoff productivity. Put differently, the higher is the equilibrium cutoff productivity of an economy and, hence, the average productivity of its firms in the market, the higher the exit rate. This becomes clear as the number of exiting mature firms in each period is given by M ⋅ δ and the number of unsuccessful entrants is ( )
Adding these up and recognizing that in the steady state
, it follows that the overall number of exiting firms is E M . No matter whether we define the overall exit rate as
our claim is easily verified. 20 Since the death rate of mature firms is constant, this implication for an economy's overall exit rate is purely driven by the negative correlation between the cutoff productivity and the exit of failing business start-ups, i.e. firms dying young. Even though it has hard to come by with solid comparable international data, this positive correlation appears to be in line with the available data. However, all its merits notwithstanding, the assumption of a constant exogenous death probability for mature firms is very strong (Redding 2010:6) . In particular, the assumption sits very uncomfortably with the facts. Concerning mature firms, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that less productive firms are much more likely to exit markets than more productive ones. This finding has consistently been obtained for a large number of countries in many studies. Apparently, more productive firms dispose of greater ability to adapt to their environment and to make higher profits and, hence, have a greater buffer against adverse shocks.
Moreover, using the perceived risk of insolvency in countries as proxy for the average death rate of mature firms a cross-country comparison suggests a negative correlation between the average death rate of mature firms and the average productivity of firms (see Pflüger and Russek 2011b) . This negative relationship is clearly at odds with Melitz (2003) .
Moreover, a nascent literature suggests that policies and institutions affecting the business climate in a broadly defined way are central for the understanding of firm dynamics, and so in particular for business exits (Bartelsmann et al. 2009 ). This literature makes clear that business conditions, i.e. the legal and institutional framework for doing business, a country's infrastructure and microeconomic policies, macroeconomic factors, and also a country's embedment into world trade are important determinants of producer dynamics and should explicitly be taken into account.
Pflüger and Russek (2011b) provide a model which takes these aspects into account. The key element of their analysis is to assume that the default risk on the level of the firms is inversely related to the firm's productivity such that 
Appendix B -Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under autarky
In equilibrium, the aggregate expenditure on manufacturing has to be equal to the aggregate revenue of manufacturing firms,
, and the equilibrium cutoff (5), the number of active firms can be
The stationarity condition then implies the number of entrants,
and the indirect utility of a household is then as in eq. (6).
Appendix C -The link between the productivity cutoffs in the open economy
From the ZCP conditions it follows that ( ) 
Appendix D: Determination of equilibrium cutoffs in the open economy
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i is given by
, we can write the expected domestic profits as 
Appendix E: Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under trade
To derive the firm masses in the open economy equilibrium we have to impose balanced trade.
From the perspective of the domestic economy, this condition is given by: 
